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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-2700 
___________ 
 
BHARAT THACKAR, 
           Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                                       Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A089-252-623) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Eugene Pugliese 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 23, 2013 
 
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 31, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Bharat Thackar seeks review of his final order of removal.  Although we write 
primarily for the parties, who are familiar with the facts of this case, we will describe the 
background in some detail because the rulings and arguments at different stages of the 
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agency proceedings are relevant to our decision here.   
The Government charged Thackar, a citizen of India, as removable for having 
overstayed his non-immigrant visa.  Thackar admitted that he overstayed the authorized 
period of admission, and the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) upheld the charge.  Thackar, a 
lawyer in his native country, sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection 
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) based on his interactions with members 
of a group called Students Islamic Movement of India (“SIMI”) after he represented a 
plaintiff in a lawsuit (relating to a land dispute) against a defendant who was a member of 
SIMI.   
 The IJ found Thackar credible, then ruled that Thackar had shown that he was 
mistreated because of a private dispute, not because of his religion, social group, or other 
ground on which asylum may be granted.  Although the IJ noted that Thackar had stated 
on cross-examination that his Hinduism was an additional reason for the attack, the IJ 
concluded that it was not the central reason and “did not play any part in this dispute as 
far as [the IJ could] tell.”  The IJ also stated that Thackar had not shown the government 
of India was unable or unwilling to control SIMI (or even provided documentation that 
SIMI existed).  The IJ further held that, even if Thackar had suffered past persecution, he 
could live safely elsewhere in India, given its vast population and Hindu majority.  The IJ 
denied the asylum and withholding claims on these grounds, and also ruled that Thackar 
3 
 
did not meet his burden for CAT relief.
1
      
 Thackar appealed the IJ‟s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).  
The BIA remanded the matter because part of the record (an asylum application and 
affidavit) was missing.  Without it, the BIA could not determine if the IJ had addressed 
all of Thackar‟s claims, including a possible claim of imputed political opinion that the 
Department of Homeland Security had mentioned.  The remand was for further 
proceedings and the entry of a new decision.  The IJ did not provide more analysis; 
instead, he issued an order to certify the record to the BIA and submitted the missing 
documents.      
 The BIA noted that the IJ had completed the record of proceedings pursuant to the 
remand and then dismissed the appeal.  The BIA affirmed the credibility finding in favor 
of Thackar and agreed with the IJ that Thackar had not met his burden of proof for 
asylum because he did not demonstrate that a central motivation for SIMI‟s interest in 
him was his political opinion, religion, or other protected characteristic.  The BIA held 
also that Thackar had not met the higher standard for withholding and ruled that he had 
waived his CAT claim by not presenting any factual or legal argument about it.   
 Thackar then filed a motion entitled “motion to reconsider claim for asylum and 
withholding of removal.”  Thackar argued that he needed only to have proved that the 
persecution he suffered was motivated in part by one of the protected grounds.  He 
                                              
1In ruling, the IJ denied Thackar‟s wife‟s derivative application, too; however, Thackar‟s  
wife is not a party to the petition for review pending before the Court.    
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pointed to a statement in which he averred that he had taken the land dispute case in order 
to take a religious and political stand against SIMI.  He contended that SIMI targeted him 
for his opposition to SIMI‟s political and religious goals, stating that it had a goal of 
building a madrasa (an Islamic religious school and/or mosque) on land it had unlawfully 
occupied in India.  Thackar also contended that the IJ was biased against him.  With his 
motion, he included an affidavit (not unlike his earlier affidavit) signed in January 2012 
and other documents.   
 The BIA denied Thackar‟s motion.  The BIA explained that Thackar, in arguing 
that he was entitled to asylum because he established that the mistreatment was motivated 
in part by a protected ground, had relied on cases that predated the REAL ID Act 
amendments, which require that a protected ground was or will be “one central reason” 
for persecution.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).  The BIA held that there had been no 
error in the application of the “one central reason” standard in Thackar‟s case.  The BIA 
rejected the claim of IJ bias.  The BIA also rejected Thackar‟s motion to the extent that it 
was also a motion to reopen.  
 Thackar presents a petition for review.  He claims that the BIA abused its 
discretion by ignoring its first decision in failing to address a claim of imputed political 
opinion.  He also contends that the BIA abused its discretion in concluding that there was 
no error in its earlier ruling that Thackar did not show the requisite nexus between the 
treatment he faced and the grounds protected by the asylum laws.     
 We note first that our jurisdiction does not extend to the BIA‟s earlier order 
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dismissing Thackar‟s appeal.  The earlier order was issued on January 10, 2012, and 
Thackar did not file a petition for review of it within the 30 days permitted by statute,  
see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).  Because the time limit is mandatory and jurisdictional, the 
Court cannot review the January order.  See Vakker v. Att‟y Gen., 519 F.3d 143, 146-47 
(3d Cir. 2008).  Furthermore, Thackar‟s later petition for review from the order denying 
his motion cannot serve as a challenge to the earlier order.  See Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 
386, 405 (1995); Nocon v. INS, 789 F.2d 1028, 1033 (3d Cir. 1986).  Accordingly, to the 
extent that Thackar challenges the degree to which the BIA considered, in its second 
order in his case, any claim of imputed political opinion, we cannot review the matter.   
 We can review the BIA‟s order denying reconsideration.2  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a); 
Vakker, 519 F.3d at 147.  Our review of that order is for abuse of discretion.  See Castro 
v. Atty‟ Gen., 671 F.3d 356, 364 (3d Cir. 2012) (citation omitted); Guo v. Ashcroft, 386 
F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted) (explaining that such a discretionary 
decision is not disturbed unless it is found to be arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law); ); 
Nocon, 789 F.2d at 1033.     
 However, in our review of the BIA‟s order, we cannot consider an issue that 
Thackar did not raise before the agency.  See Lin v. Att‟y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 121-22 (3d 
Cir. 2008).  We have outlined above the focus of Thackar‟s motion before the BIA, and 
                                              
2
 We also have jurisdiction over a decision denying reopening, see Cruz v. Att‟y Gen., 
452 F.3d  240, 246 (3d Cir. 2006), but Thackar does not appear to challenge that aspect 
of the BIA‟s decision.  We note nonetheless that the decision to deny reopening is 
supported by the reasons given by the BIA.   
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we have also reviewed the motion in more detail.  With our knowledge of what Thackar 
argues on appeal, we can infer that Thackar may have been trying to approach the issue 
of an ignored claim of imputed political opinion when, in his preliminary statement in his 
motion to the BIA, he said that there was “no nexus between the Board‟s remand decision 
and the current decision.”  A.R. 23.  However, he failed to articulate this claim before the 
BIA, and we have no reason to believe the BIA was on notice that he wanted the BIA to 
address a claim of persecution based on imputed political opinion.  Accordingly, we 
review Thackar‟s nexus claim only as the BIA was presented with it. 
 The BIA‟s rejection of Thackar‟s argument that a protected ground needed to be 
only part of the motivation for any persecution was not contrary to law.  The REAL ID 
Act amendments superseded earlier analysis that allowed relief on a showing that 
persecution was based “at least in part” by a protected ground.  See Li v. Att‟y Gen., 633 
F.3d 136, 142 n.4 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).  The statute, as amended, now 
requires that an asylum seeker show that a protected ground “„was or will be at least one 
central reason‟” for persecution.  See id. (quoting and emphasizing the language of 8 
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i)); see also Ndayshimiye v. Att‟y Gen. of the U.S., 557 F.3d 
124, 130-31 (3d Cir. 2009).   
Furthermore, the BIA reasonably concluded that the “one central reason” standard 
had been properly applied in Thackar‟s case.  Thackar mentioned (without elaboration) 
his religion on cross-examination, and, in an early (but unsworn) document he submitted, 
discussed his motivation for taking the land-dispute case.  The defendant in that suit may 
7 
 
have been a SIMI member or have had SIMI interests.  However, Thackar, in his 
testimony and affidavit, essentially described a dispute based on the institution and loss 
of a lawsuit.  There is support in the record for the conclusion that the defendant in the 
land dispute attacked him for representing the plaintiff in the case and attacked him again 
when the judge ruled in the plaintiff‟s favor (although Thackar had withdrawn from the 
case by that point, the defendant blamed him for the outcome).    
 For the reasons given above, we will dismiss the petition for review to the extent it 
raises issues beyond the scope of our jurisdiction, and we will otherwise deny the petition 
for review.      
